Re: Fwd: When Interfaces Kill

["John Stricker" <jstricke@domain.elided>]

It would be interesting if it were halfway correct.

The LongEZ is very similar to the Cozy I'm building.  The Cozy is basically
a widened Long.  The fuel systems are nearly identical.  This is not a
subject with which I am unfamiliar.  So let us begin........

. He died in an aircraft that had already
: >done its best to kill two previous pilots, an aircraft with a human
: >interface flaw so fundamental, so profound, that it finally managed to
kill.
: >

Pardon my French, but BULLSHIT.  True, it was not to plans.  The original
builder was a gentleman that wanted the fuel lines OUT OF the cockpit and
the aircraft had amassed something on the order of 1500 hours of accident
free flight before this.

: >These shutoff valves, on some aircraft, serve a second purpose, letting
you
: >choose between a tank located in the left wing and a tank located in the
: >right wing. I've never received a lucid explanation for why this is a
good
: >thing, but a lot of planes have it, so I guess it must be good. (I prefer
: >flying aircraft that have a "Both" position, so all this gas selection
can
: >be avoided.)

The reason it CAN be a good thing and why Piper still uses it is that if you
pick up a load of contaminated fuel somehow and it is isolated to one tank
you can run on the other.  It also gives you a built in reserve in that if
you switch when one is close to empty and then run the other dry you do have
some left for emergency use.  Aircraft are notorious for getting water in
the fuel, usually through the caps, but not usually in both tanks.  If the
writer didn't know this, then they really don't have the necessary
background to write such an "in-depth" piece on the subject.

: >
: >He did so, however, at a terrible cost to the human interface, because
the
: >only way to switch tanks was to let go of the controls, twist your head
to
: >the left to look behind you, reach over your left shoulder with your
right
: >hand, find the valve, and turn it. As the National Transportation Safety
: >Board (NTSB) discovered, it was difficult to do this without bracing
: >yourself with your right foot_by pressing the right rudder pedal all the
: >way to the floor. And that's what killed John Denver. His plane was seen
: >vearing to the right and plunging into the ocean from only a few hundred
: >feet up, consistent with the NTSB's reconstruction.
: >

This is correct only as it pertains to John Denver.  The original builder
was a tall guy with long arms.  The a/c was built for him, by him.  he could
easily reach the selector over his left shoulder with his right hand without
depressing the rudder pedal.

In the time that transpired between HIS active use of the airplane and the
sale to John Denver, the valve had become sticky, really a normal thing and
easily fixed with disassembly and lube with a product called fuelube.  This
and the fact that John Denver was 6-7 inches shorter than the builder made
it difficult for him to switch.  Because HE HAD TO GO FLY IT, he chose to
"help" by putting a pair of visegrips on the selector but that still didn't
improve his ability to reach it, just the leverage on the selector.

: >The fuel: Denver had three ways to ensure he had enough fuel. Evidence
: >suggests he made use of two of them:
: >
: >1. He had fuel gauges in the rear of the aircraft, behind the pilot, and
a
: >   mirror (!) used to look at them. However, the fuel gauges were not
linear
: >   and had no markings to indicate that apparently half-full was really
: >   close to empty.
: >2. He dipped a rod into the fuel tanks while pre-checking the plane
before
: >   flight to test the fuel level. He may not have been aware, however,
that,
: >   because of the way the Long EZ rests, the fuel tends to slosh toward
the
: >   fuel tank filler port, giving a highly-optomistic reading.
: >3. The third method is filling the tanks, which Denver failed to do. I
never
: >   fly with anything but full tanks, and most pilots I know act likewise.
: >

Bull.  John Denver killed himself with arrogance.  Even though he had
equipment that was functioning improperly (the sticky valve), that was
located in a position that he, due to his size, could not reach, and that he
apparently couldn't add how many gallons of fuel he'd used or were left in
the tank, HE STILL CHOSE TO FLY.  And he paid the price for it.

This is the lesson here.  Not the ergonomics.  He KNEW he couldn't reach the
damn thing.  He had a guy on the ramp offer to top his tanks for him.  He
knew the valve was broken and flew anyway (he'd even made arrangements for
it to be FIXED while he was on tour).

Now, back to Scouts and off-roading, in our arrogance, how often have we
crawled under there with just a floor jack holding it up, because we knew it
would "be all right"?  How many times did we push our luck by driving just a
"bit" over the speed we felt comfortable at?  How many times did we take off
down the trail with ours or our passengers not harnessed in?

: >John Denver learned the biggest lesson of all, even if he only had a few
: >seconds to appreciate it: Let the User Beware! And, indeed, the NTSB, as
: >per it's long history of ignoring human factors in aviation accidents,
: >blamed the entire matter on him. Had he bothered to fuel his aircraft,
had
: >he spent the time to thoroughly familiarize himself with the
ideosycracies
: >of an experimental aircraft, he would be alive and well today.
: >

I'm not a big fan of the NTSB and it's reports.  But in this case, they got
it exactly right.  No, the selector wasn't where it was suited for him, but
the a/c wasn't BUILT for him.  He should have known the amount of fuel on
board.  Period.  It's a violation of the regs not to know.  BTW, this is the
first time I've read that he dipped the tanks.  The NTSB report doesn't say
that and none of the witnesses there said they saw him do it either.

As far as the "ideosycracies"  (nice writing, if this was supposed to be a
professional) of an experimental aircraft, hell make that of ANY aircraft.
I've flown about 100 different Piper Cherokees.  All of them PA28-XXX of
some sort.  Every damn one of them was different.  Has nothing to do with
experimentals or factory built.  Has to do with the airplane being a
balancing act and that balance is different for every one of them.

: >However, to those of us versed in even rudimentary human factors, it is
easy
: >to see that the design of this fuel system was a disaster waiting to
happen,
: >as was borne out not only by what Denver experienced, but by incidents
: >reported by two previous pilots of this same plane who almost met death
: >under the same circumstances.

No it wasn't.  It was a perfectly safe and logical way of doing it.....for
the original builder.  It's not his fault that someone smaller gets in and
it doesn't fit.  Is it a "design error" if you get in a suit 5 sizes too big
for you and you look like crap and trip over the pants legs??  Of course
not.  The proper tool for the job is what's required, not the arrogance of
believing that if so-and-so did it I can too.

: >With all of general aviation's emphasis on safety, the human factors of
: >small planes and the environment in which they fly would be laughable, if
: >it weren't so dangerous. Why? Because the whole thing is awash in
"macho."

What a load of crap.  I recently spec'd out a panel refit for the twin
Comanche I fly.  It would put the flight instruments into the current
standard configuration and do away with the plastic faceplates over the
panel, replacing them with aluminum.  No new radios, no new instruments.
Just relocate the ones that are there and the new covers.  $980 for the
covers, about $2200 for the labor.  (Of course, you see, I can't do the work
since it would be a "major" change and would need an IA to sign off and file
the paperwork with the FAA in the form of a form 337.)

This would enhance safety, make it more ergonomically friendly, and more
attractive to boot.  But it's just to expensive and the aircraft would be
down for about 2 weeks minimum.

Look at the new airplanes, even the small ones.  Most are very ergonomically
efficient.  But even the manufacturers are limited as to what they can do
without making a significant enough change to invalidate the original type
certificate.  And believe me, they don't want to re-certify.

It has nothing to do with "macho" and everything to do with regulatory BS.
Plain and simple.  I don't know of a single pilot that, given the
opportunity and reasonable cost, wouldn't jump at the chance to improve the
safety and ergonomics of his aircraft.

Arrogance and just plain stupidity killed John Denver.  Regular old bad
judgement.  Something he had a history of having if someone would like to
get into that with me privately, and how his medical was in the process of
being revoked (it had NOT been revoked at the time of the accident, but he
had been sent registered mail from the FAA demanding him to surrender the
medical, but he refused to accept the registered mail so a formal revocation
was in progress) we can do that here, but it's even further from the charter
than the original post was.

Denver did a stupid, arrogant thing and it killed him.

Sometimes we do stupid arrogant things off-road or in the shop.  We run the
same chances of an identical result to Mr. Denver's, every time we do them.
That's the real lesson here.

John Stricker

jstricke@domain.elided

"I didn't spend all these years getting to the top of the food chain
just to become a vegetarian"